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With the advent of the public opinion poll, politicians began to have access to highly reliable 
information about the electorate's views on issues. Prior to this development, party leaders 
could only make educated guesses about public opinion. These guesses, however, were often 
incorrect, since they were based on unsystematic evidence. But armed with polls, parties 
should avoid such errors, approximating Downs' (1957) assumption of certainty. If so, rational 
parties should converge near the center of the distribution of public opinion. Or in other words, 
parties should no longer polarize on highly salient issues that confront the nation. 
This conclusion has important implications for the study of partisan realignments. The best 
work on the subject by scholars like Sundquist (1983) and Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue 
that one requirement for a realignment is that the parties must polarize on an issue of high 
salience to the public. Yet well-informed, rational parties should not engage in such behavior, 
suggesting that critical realignments may be things of the past. Note that partisan change still 
occurs-perhaps along the lines of Key's (1959) notion of secular realignment or Carmines' and 
Stimson's (1989) concept of "issue evolution." 
Until recently politicians have operated under conditions of great uncer- 
tainty when deciding what positions to take on issues. They had only rough 
guesses about public opinion, which stemmed from such things as the results 
of the prior election, attendance at political rallies, and editorials in local 
newspapers. With the development of the public opinion poll, however, 
politicians began to have access to highly reliable information about the elec- 
torate's views. Now, with better sampling techniques and improved question 
wording, polls provide politicians with more useful information than at any 
other time since the extension of mass suffrage in the nineteenth century.' 
I would like to thank Thad Brown, Pat Crittenden, Rich Dagger, Rick Herrera, Tom Rochon, 
Harold Stanley, Doug Van Belle, and Steve Walker for assistance on earlier drafts of this paper. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1988 APSA meetings. 
'Kelley (1983) observes that prior to the 1800s politicians may have possessed a good deal of 
information about voters' views. During that period, electorates were small and voting was 
public. Under those conditions, local politicians may have been able to learn first-hand about 
voters' preferences. The expansion of the eligible electorate and the adoption of the secret ballot 
altered the situation, however. It was not until the development of survey research that poli- 
ticians once again had access to what voters thought about various issues and candidates. 
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This development should affect the behavior of politicians and parties. For 
instance, party leaders should be able to write platforms that are more in line 
with public opinion. When forming strategy for a campaign, candidates and 
their staffs should have a better idea of what plans will work and what will 
not. The party leadership should also know more about the electoral pros- 
pects of candidates in the general election, which will allow them to support 
the most electable contenders. 
Another important implication stemming from the development of the 
public opinion poll, which is the subject of this paper, is that parties should 
no longer form sharp disagreements with their rivals on issues that are highly 
salient to the electorate. Recall that Downs (1957) shows that rational parties 
operating under conditions of perfect information will converge at the center 
of the distribution of opinion. Of course, polls do not provide perfect infor- 
mation. But polls should provide office-seeking politicians with enough 
quality information to keep them from staking out vastly different positions 
on issues of high salience to the public. In other words, rational parties will 
no longer adopt polarized positions on issues of great importance to the 
electorate. 
This conclusion has important implications for the study of partisan re- 
alignments. Most scholars agree that a crucial ingredient in any realignment 
is that the parties must stake out clearly different positions on issues of high 
salience to the public (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983; Carmines and Stim- 
son 1981, 1984, 1989). Without polarized parties, citizens lack the incentive 
to alter existing partisan attachments or to form new ones. Now, however, 
rational parties, knowing the public's views on highly salient issues, should 
not adopt vastly different positions on those matters. Consequently, the 
public opinion poll may have fundamentally altered the process of partisan 
change, casting a monkey wrench into our theories of realignment. No 
longer should we expect sharp, durable changes normally associated with pe- 
riods of "critical" realignments. Instead, partisan change will be more grad- 
ual, perhaps along the lines of Key's (1959) notion of secular realignment or 
Carmines' and Stimson's (1989) concept of "issue evolution." 
On the surface, at least, this argument has some appeal. Since the mid- 
1960s, political scientists have been expecting a realignment of the party sys- 
tem. Yet that event has not occurred. Of course, some scholars view the ab- 
sence of such change as evidence that the concept of realignment is flawed 
(see especially Carmines and Stimson 1989). While there are problems with 
the concept, this paper offers an alternative explanation for why there has 
not been a period of rapid partisan change since the 1930s. 
A SPATIAL CONCEPTION OF REALIGNMENT 
The logic of spatial modeling is well suited for the study of partisan re- 
alignments. One can, quite simply, view a realignment as a change in the 
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distribution of voters' preferences. That is, the midpoint of the distribution 
shifts to either the left or the right in response to some political event, such 
as an economic depression or a war. This shift, however, must be "sharp and 
durable" before it can be considered a realignment (Key 1955, 16). Political 
scientists agree that the minor fluctuations in public opinion accompanying 
most elections do not constitute a realignment. Consequently, a realignment 
in a Downsian world would be a significant shift in the distribution of voters' 
preferences that will last over a series of elections.2 
This conception of realignment is consistent with most previous theories. 
In fact, the literature on realignment is replete with references that are spa- 
tial in nature. Burnham (1970, 7), for instance, argues that in a realignment 
"issue distances between the parties are markedly increased." The notion of 
"issue distances" fits with the reasoning behind spatial modeling. Sundquist 
(1983, 14), on the other hand, views a realignment as "those redistributions 
of party support, of whatever scale or pace, that reflect a change in the struc- 
ture of party conflict and hence the establishment of a new line of partisan 
cleavage on a different axis within the electorate." The phrases "partisan 
cleavage" and "axis within the electorate" are also consistent with a spatial 
representation. Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980, 31) argue that a realign- 
ment involves the "formation of a new distribution of partisan loyalties in the 
electorate." The idea of a "distribution" fits within a spatial framework. Fi- 
nally, Carmines and Stimson (1989) contend that highly salient issues help 
forge partisan change in the electorate. Again, one can conceptualize the 
idea of a "highly salient issue" in spatial terms. 
While there are similarities between previous definitions and this Down- 
sian conception, at least one important difference emerges. For Sundquist 
(1983) and Schattschneider (1975), a realignment involves two-dimensional 
space. That is, a realignment occurs when a highly salient issue cuts across 
the existing political continuum. Yet under the definition posited above, a 
realignment is a sharp and durable shift in the existing distribution of opin- 
ion. Aldrich (1983) actually uses the idea of a cross-cutting issue, building a 
multidimensional model to capture the process of realignment. 
For this paper, however, I shall adopt the simpler unidimensional assump- 
tion. While this choice at first glance may appear problematic, it is defen- 
sible. If one thinks of the political continuum not as representing the public's 
21 am being vague about what constitutes "significant" and "durable." The literature is also 
vague on this subject (Sundquist 1983, chap. 1). One could set precise standards, but such an 
exercise would be arbitrary. For instance, assume that durable means that the change must last 
at least four elections. But just prior to the third election under a new party arrangement, war 
breaks out. This conflict alters the partisan views of the electorate. While the attitudes prior to 
the war were entrenched, the trauma of that military conflict changed them. So, just because 
the change did not last four elections, does that mean we should not consider that earlier shift to 
be a realignment? As one can see, this issue is sticky. 
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view on a particular realigning issue, but rather as a representation of a 
whole array of concerns, then a cross-cutting issue can be worked into this 
Downsian definition. That is, whatever dominant issue confronts the coun- 
try, whether it be slavery or government intervention in the economy, 
voters can still be aligned along a single dimension that will incorporate that 
issue. The distribution of opinion, therefore, represents the summation of 
voters' preferences on a large number of issues. And when an issue arises of 
great importance to the electorate, it can dramatically alter the shape of that 
distribution. 
Sundquist (1983, 204), ironically, lends support for the view that a realign- 
ment can be viewed within a single dimension, as indicated by his descrip- 
tion of the 1930s realignment: "The Hoover of 1928 may have been a moder- 
ate centrist, in the political spectrum of that time, but in four years of 
calamity the whole spectrum moved sharply to the left. By 1932 the center 
had slipped from under the president and had stranded him, his heels dug 
in, at the extreme. And his party, save for its insurgent minority, was 
stranded with him." 
While one may still be dissatisfied with the unidimensional assumption, 
the idea that voters are aligned along a single continuum is, at least, more 
realistic for the study of realignments than for the study of specific elections. 
As we know, parties compete on a variety of issues in any given election. Yet 
Downsian models often assume just a single dimension. This simplification 
has, of course, drawn much criticism (see, for instance, Stokes 1966). But 
despite these reservations, this simple model has provided a powerful expla- 
nation for the behavior of parties. And since realignments involve the 
struggle between the parties on some highly salient issue, such as govern- 
mental activism, the unidimensional assumption should be able to provide a 
compelling account of how parties behave during periods of rapid partisan 
change. 
MOTIVATION OF PARTIES 
With a spatial conception of realignment in place, I now turn to the ques- 
tion of what motivates the behavior of parties. Downs (1957) originally as- 
sumed that parties seek only to win elections and that views pertaining to 
public policy are simply a means of gaining votes. Over the last two decades, 
however, the traditional assumption that parties are not concerned with pol- 
icy has come under attack (see, for instance, Schlesinger 1975; Wittman 
1973, 1983; Chappell and Keech 1986; Herrera 1989). As Wittman (1983, 
142) observed, "in the real world candidates are both office oriented and 
issue oriented." One need only look at the array of data presented by Miller 
(1988) to see that the leadership of the parties are indeed concerned about 
public policy. 
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For the purpose of this paper, however, I shall assume that parties are 
solely concerned with winning elections. Given that this paper deals with 
realignment, the assumption is reasonable. While parties, as noted above, 
have concerns about policy, a "realigning" issue alters their calculations. If a 
party in the face of a realigning issue adopts its preferred position rather than 
the electorate's preferred position, it risks establishing itself as the minority 
party. In that weakened position, a party's chances of gaining office (and pur- 
suing public policy) are greatly diminished. Thus, a rational party (whether 
motivated by policy or not) must pursue a vote-seeking strategy when con- 
fronted with a realigning issue or risk being denied access to government on 
a long-term basis. 
Wittman (1983) offers support for this position, arguing that as a policy be- 
comes more important in affecting the outcome of the election, the more a 
party will move away from its preferred position, if necessary. And since re- 
aligning issues can alter the very fabric of an election (and even future ones), 
rational parties are very likely to behave in the classic Downsian manner 
when addressing such concerns. 
In addition, if one assumes that parties are interested in pursuing a variety 
of different policies, it makes even more sense for rational parties to sacrifice 
their own views on a realigning issue. While that issue is, by definition, cen- 
tral to voters, it is likely to be only one of many issues of consequence to the 
parties. Thus, by adopting a vote-maximizing strategy for realigning issues, 
parties may then be able to position themselves closer to their own views on 
issues of less salience to the public. 
In sum, while parties have policy objectives, it seems reasonable to as- 
sume that parties are solely interested in vote-maximizing when it comes to 
an issue that threatens to realign the party system. 
A DOWNSIAN ACCOUNT OF REALIGNMENT 
In chapter 8, Downs (1957) examines how vote-seeking parties will com- 
pete with each other under different conditions. One of the more famous 
conclusions is that parties will converge at the midpoint in the distribution of 
voters' preferences (see diagram 1).3 This conclusion applies to a stable po- 
litical system; that is, a system where the distribution of voters' preferences 
remains the same. But as noted above, a realignment involves a significant 
3Parties will not, however, offer identical platforms. If parties adopt the same views on issues, 
rational voters will lack the incentive to turn out since it will not matter which party wins the 
election. Thus, parties have reason to differentiate themselves a little bit. Empirically this ap- 
pears to be the case. While the Democratic and Republican parties often adopt similar views on 
issues, the positions are rarely identical. Smithies (1941) was the first to introduce the idea that 
elasticity will provide firms (parties) incentive to present slightly different products (platforms) 
to the public. 
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DIAGRAM 1 
DOWNS'S CLASSIC MODEL OF PARTY COMPETITION 
Party A _ Mid- Party B point 
See Downs (1957, 118). 
DIAGRAM 2 
PARTIES' REACTION TO SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION 
New Midpoint Old Midpoint 
Public Opinion - _ - Public Opinion 
After Shift Pror to Shift 
Parly A 
Party B 
and durable change in the distribution of public opinion. When such a 
change occurs, however, rational parties should still compete at the center of 
the distribution by rapidly adjusting their position in an effort to maximize 
support (see diagram 2). The parties, therefore, should quickly adopt similar 
positions in the new distribution of opinion in order to maximize votes. 
But if parties adjust quickly and thus continue to offer similar views along 
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this dimension, the electorate will not have sufficient incentive to adopt new 
partisan loyalties. As Sundquist (1983, 302) argues, "unless and until there is 
a clear and significant difference in the positions of political parties on an 
issue, there is no reason for persons aroused by that issue to shift party loy- 
alties, or, among those new to the electorate or politically independent, to 
choose to identify with a party." Consequently, the rational behavior of vote- 
seeking parties should prevent large shifts in the partisan attachments of the 
electorate. In other words, Downsian logic indicates that critical realign- 
ments should not occur. 
Yet there have been periods of significant partisan change in U. S. history, 
which contradicts this account of realignment. However, there is an impor- 
tant assumption underlying this Downsian analysis: namely, that both parties 
have complete information about public opinion. When parties know the 
distribution of opinion, they can position themselves to maximize their sup- 
port. But during past realignments, parties did not have complete informa- 
tion. Politicians could estimate public opinion, but their guesses were 
fraught with error (Nimmo 1970; Mendelsohn and Crespi 1970; Sabato 
1981). In addition, parties often relied on vastly different sources of informa- 
tion to make decisions. One party might, for instance, use the reaction of the 
crowd to a candidate's speech, while the other party might pay more atten- 
tion to what local politicians thought was the mood of the public. Parties, 
therefore, could easily differ in their interpretation of the public's position on 
an issue, leading them to take opposing viewpoints.4 Note that these posi- 
tions would still be "rational," given the parties' information about public 
opinion at the time. 
Thus, when a highly salient issue confronted the public and the parties 
had different perceptions of the electorate's views, critical realignments were 
possible. Under these circumstances, voters could perceive differences be- 
tween the parties, leading them to develop a commitment to the party that 
better represented their views. Diagram 3 illustrates this process of partisan 
change under conditions of imperfect information. In this new alignment, 
the majority party (A) correctly gauged public opinion, while the minority 
party (B) made an error in political judgment.3 
4Calvert (1985) argues that whether candidates operate with certainty or uncertainty, con- 
vergence to the median voter still occurs-a conclusion which on the surface contradicts my 
account of how parties can polarize on issues. It turns out, however, that my notion of uncer- 
tainty differs from Calvert's. For him, even when politicians lack perfect information, both par- 
ties still possess the same, although flawed, view of the electorate. My point, in contrast, is that 
prior to polls, politicians not only lack good information about voters' views, but also periodi- 
cally developed different perceptions of the electorate's position on these issues. It is these dif- 
fering perceptions of the electorate that led to polarization. 
"Note that in diagram 3 parties exhibit more mobility than is usually permitted in models of 
party competition. As Downs (1957, 122) argued, "political parties cannot move ideologically 
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DIAGRAM 3 
PARTIES' REACTION TO SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
New Midpoint Old Midpoint 
Public Opinion _ Public Opinion 
After Shift - - PnortoShift 
Party A 
Party B 
In sum, critical realignments can be viewed as products of the judgments 
of poorly informed politicians who mistakenly lead their party away from the 
center of public opinion.6 
Obviously, one cannot test this model, since there is no way to know 
whether politicians of the past would have acted differently with access to 
polls. But there are some examples from history that are suggestive. In the 
past each other. . . . (I)ntegrity and responsibility create immobility, which prevents a party 
from making ideological leaps over the heads of its neighbors." But in periods of realignments, 
the political situation is likely to be in flux. Some large issue dominating the public's agenda may 
allow parties greater freedom than in periods of political calm. Downs (1957, 110) actually sug- 
gests this possibility when stating that "ideological immobility is characteristic of every respon- 
sible party, because it cannot repudiate its past actions unless some radical change in conditions 
justify this." Periods of war or depression can be thought of as the "radical change" that justifies 
allowing parties greater mobility. 
6Clubb and associates (1980) and Kleppner (1987) offer a competing explanation for realign- 
ments that questions whether the "mistakes" of politicians could generate partisan change. They 
contend that realignments are the result of one party adopting policies that solve some political 
trauma facing the nation. Thus, the realignment in the 1930s only became reality once FDR's 
policies were perceived as effective by the electorate. 
While their arguments have much merit, the role of polarization can still be central in the 
process. That is, if the GOP had offered programs that looked very much like the Democrats in 
1936, the electorate would not have been offered such a clear choice. And under that condition, 
the degree of partisan change might well have been lessened. I am not suggesting that the GOP 
could have won the 1936 presidential election; rather, that the Republicans might have been 
able to avoid becoming the minority party. 
Obviously, one can only speculate here. My point, however, is simply that one of the central 
ingredients in a realignment involves the polarization of parties on a highly salient issue. 
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realignment of the 1930s, for instance, the parties polarized over the role of 
the federal government in the economy. These disagreements surfaced quite 
clearly in the presidential election of 19367-a time when the best available 
measures of public opinion sent mixed signals about the electorate's willing- 
ness to support FDR's programs. The Democrats had scored major victories 
in the 1934 midterm congressional elections, suggesting that their programs 
were popular with the electorate. Yet by 1935, there was evidence that an 
anti-New Deal sentiment was growing in the country (see Schlesinger 1960). 
The Republicans, for example, had captured the New York State Assembly, 
which many political observers interpreted as a defeat for the New Deal. As 
FDR's campaign manager, James Farley (1938, 291), recounts: "The Demo- 
crats fared rather badly in a few of the state elections that year, and naturally 
those minor victories were hailed by the opposition as a trustworthy sign 
of shifting political winds" (my emphasis). In addition, the now famous 
Literary Digest Polls showed that Landon and the Republicans could win 
the 1936 election, further indicating that the New Deal may have been 
waning in popularity (McCoy 1966, 264). These kinds of mixed signals may 
have helped fuel the belief of old guard Republicans that the public was not 
supportive of the New Deal (Schlesinger 1960; Weed 1989), encouraging 
them to remain committed to their long-standing views on government 
intervention. 
The realignment of the 1890s may also be attributable to politicians' rely- 
ing on flawed measures of public opinion. William Jennings Bryan appar- 
ently had good reason to believe that his strong support of free silver would 
lead him to victory in 1896. Many of Bryan's campaign speeches drew enor- 
mous crowds (Jones 1964; Hollingsworth 1963), indicating a possible ground- 
swell of support for free silver. Anderson (1981), for instance, reports that 
Bryan "spoke to crowds of 50,000 in Columbus, 10,000 in Springfield, and 
7In 1932, the Democrats and Republicans showed little disagreement over most matters of 
policy (Page 1978). The Democrats, for instance, were quite vague about how to solve the De- 
pression. By 1936, however, polarization arose between the parties. The GOP in that year's 
platform criticized the New Deal for usurping "the rights reserved to the states and to the 
people" and calling for the return of relief programs to local authorities (Johnson and Porter 
1973, 365-66). This same document also attacked the New Deal's effort to create government 
jobs as a temporary and costly solution to unemployment. All in all, the Republican party in 
1936 was committed to relying "on the character and virtue, self-reliance, industry and thrift of 
the people," not "on the wisdom and power of the government" (Johnson and Porter 1973, 370). 
The Democrats, by comparison, produced a platform in 1936 committed to an activist federal 
government. The platform supported the federal government's role in helping the unemployed, 
farmers, senior citizens, labor, those stricken by natural disasters, and individuals who faced 
foreclosure on their homes (Johnson and Porter 1973, 360-63). 
The Democrats clearly adjusted their position in the few years after the 1932 election. And 
since the Republicans remained committed to minimizing the federal government's role in the 
economy, polarization of the parties emerged over that issue. 
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40,000 in Toledo, all in McKinley's own Ohio." Anderson (1981, 90) then 
notes that "so large were his crowds elsewhere that predictions of his victory 
were commonplace, the New York Herald anticipating in October that he 
would win 237 electoral votes, thirteen more than sufficient for election." 
Bryan also received numerous letters from voters-a further testimony to 
his popularity (Colletta 1968). These kinds of measures gave Bryan reason to 
believe he was hitting a responsive chord with the public. The problem is 
that these judgments were based on unsystematic data, which gave Bryan a 
plausible but mistaken belief that the issue of free silver would provide him a 
majority of the electorate's support.8 
Surely, there were signs indicating that Bryan and Landon were making 
mistakes, since FDR and McKinley steered their parties on the correct 
course. But the point is that given the kind of information available, one 
could easily develop vastly different interpretations of public opinion. These 
interpretations were no doubt molded, in part, by the predispositions of 
these politicians. That is, given Bryan's support of free silver, he and his 
aides looked for evidence indicating that the public supported their position. 
With the availability of public opinion polls, politicians should now be able 
to avoid these kinds of mistakes. Consider Ronald Reagan. All indications are 
that he personally supported making social security voluntary (Drew 1981, 
263-64, 298). Yet despite this view, Reagan contended that he supported a 
safety net for the less fortunate in the 1980 campaign and even promised an 
increase in benefits (Drew 1981, 308). The difference between Reagan's 
rhetoric and his personal view may have been attributable to Richard 
Wirthlin, his pollster, who showed him hard evidence that the public would 
not support making social security voluntary. Without Wirthlin's polling data 
Reagan may have been swayed by his own personal views and by the large 
and supportive crowds that would surely have come to hear him express 
those views, which might have encouraged him to polarize the parties on the 
issue of social security. 
We will, of course, never know whether these interpretations are correct. 
But the scenarios at least seem plausible. There is one thing of which we can 
be confident: polls have become an integral part of all national campaigns 
and politicians respond to the information they supply. As early as 1939, 
FDR used information from polls to make political decisions (Roll and Can- 
tril 1972). In 1952, Eisenhower's aides relied on polls to shape the content of 
their television advertisements (Sabato 1981, 69). Nowadays polls dominate 
the conduct of national campaigns. Reagan's campaign strategy against 
Jimmy Carter was shaped directly by information from polls (Wirthlin, 
Breglio, and Beal 1981). Gary Hart literally built his 1984 campaign theme of 
8For an interesting account of the mistakes parties made in assessing public opinion in the 
pre-Civil War era, see Gienapp (1987). 
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"new ideas and new leadership" from a poll conducted by Pat Caddell. Most 
recently, George Bush's attacks against Michael Dukakis were based on in- 
formation culled from surveys. 
Polls, of course, are not the only source of information politicians use, but 
they may be the most important. As Robert Teeter, Ford's director of re- 
search in the 1976 presidential election, observed: "There were two kinds 
of considerations: first, some conclusions we drew ourselves about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the president as a campaigner; second, the per- 
ceived differences between the candidates as shown by our polling data. The 
second group of considerations was the most important in our discussions 
with the president and in our campaign planning after the convention" 
(Moore and Fraser 1977, 119). In short, politicians clearly rely on (and will 
continue to rely on) public opinion polls to make political decisions, which 
should result in minimizing the differences between the parties on matters of 
high salience to the public. 
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
One might argue that even with the availability of polls, parties will still 
periodically polarize on highly salient issues. For instance, while survey re- 
search provides better information than was available to politicians prior to 
the 1940s, polls simply do not supply anything close to "perfect" informa- 
tion. Polls produce different results from time to time because of different 
sampling designs, wording of questions, or just random error. These kind of 
differences might fuel polarization. In addition, politicians can vary in their 
interpretation of the data from polls, which can lead to errors and possibly to 
polarization. As Page (1978, 32) comments: "Their are .. . many uncertain- 
ties in reading the tea leaves of public opinion, not the least of which is the 
nagging concern that given the low levels of information and imperfect ques- 
tion wording, poll results may be meaningless." 
I am not contending that polls always provide "perfect" information. 
Clearly, for issues of little importance to the electorate, such as aid to Poland 
or price supports for farmers, public opinion would be tricky to interpret, 
even with access to good polling data. But for potentially realigning issues, it 
seems likely that polls will provide enough information to make this assump- 
tion reasonable. First, since potentially realigning issues will be, by defini- 
tion, important to much of the public, respondents are likely to have clearer 
positions on them, which should lessen concerns about a poorly informed 
electorate. Second, if an issue arises that is powerful enough to forge a re- 
alignment, there will be a good number of polls available, both private and 
commercial, to provide politicians with lots of information regarding the 
issue. Sabato (1981, 68), for instance, reports that CBS and NBC conducted 
65 public opinion surveys during the 1980 presidential campaign. Such a 
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wealth of information should keep politicians from relying on any one mis- 
leading poll that might have led them to adopt an unpopular position. The 
popular press will also rely on polls in their discussion of the issues, supply- 
ing additional insights about public opinion. Moreover, if the findings of vari- 
ous polls disagree about the electorate's views, those discrepancies will trig- 
ger further surveys in an effort to sort out the differences among them. The 
final result should be well-informed politicians with roughly the same pic- 
ture of the electorate, which should encourage them not to adopt polarizing 
positions on highly salient issues. 
One might still contend that though less likely, polarization on highly sa- 
lient issues is still possible. One cannot, of course, claim there is no chance 
of polarization. But such errors should be less common than prior to the de- 
velopment of survey research and realignments were rare events even be- 
fore polls. Moreover, and perhaps just as important, polls provide evidence 
that allows politicians to correct errors made in the previous election. Thus, 
if parties adopt different views on an issue important to the public, poll re- 
sults should provide evidence that would encourage the losing party to cor- 
rect its mistake for the next election. These kinds of adjustments make polar- 
ization, even if it occurs, a short-term event, undercutting the prospect of 
significant partisan change. 
While this argument may have some appeal, one might counter that in 
recent times parties have occasionally "polarized" on issues. The Goldwater 
and McGovern campaigns are two prime examples of where politicians, 
armed with polls, provided the electorate with a "choice, not an echo." 
These examples, however, do not, upon close examination, undermine my 
basic argument. To begin, while it is true that Goldwater and McGovern did 
adopt some unpopular positions on issues, it is not clear these positions were 
"extreme." Page (1978), for instance, argues that if one looks at the actual 
rhetoric of these candidates, their views on issues were not that far out of the 
mainstream. Kelley (1983) provides support for Page's position, showing that 
the electorate's rejection of these two candidates was more due to their per- 
sonal qualities than to the adoption of "extreme" views on issues. In addi- 
tion, Kessel (1968, 192-200) provides some evidence that polls did have the 
effect on the Goldwater campaign that my model predicts. For instance, in 
September 1964, Goldwater's strategists gathered survey data showing that 
social security and nuclear responsibility were two issues hurting the cam- 
paign. This evidence led Goldwater's aides to develop new television adver- 
tisements to address these problems. Now, of course, these responses did 
not stem LBJ's landslide, but it does show that in a supposedly "ideological" 
campaign polls were influential. McGovern also relied on polls to make po- 
litical decisions during the campaign. Interestingly, Caddell's polls showed 
that McGovern's difficulties stemmed not from his views on issues, but from 
the public's doubts about his competency to be president (White 1973, 359). 
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Thus, the senator from South Dakota did not need to adopt more moderate 
positions on issues, but instead needed to find a way to make himself appear 
more competent.9 Finally, Page (1978) presents some data indicating that 
these two contenders moderated their positions on issues in the fall cam- 
paign-behavior that is consistent with this theory. 
One could still argue, however, that while polls played some role in these 
campaigns, the information from these surveys still did not prevent these 
two nominees from offering at least a few unpopular positions on issues. 
While these cases appear to cast doubt on my argument, the logic of this 
model does not require that parties adopt the same position on all issues. 
First, my argument applies only to potentially realigning issues. For issues of 
less importance to the public, parties can offer different views. Since these 
concerns, by definition, will not enter into the calculations of most voters, 
parties can risk offering nonmedian positions on then. Second, my argument 
only suggests that parties will adopt similar positions on highly salient 
issues. Or in other words, polls lead parties to lessen their differences, not 
end them. As a result, candidates like McGovern and Goldwater can appear 
on the political stage from time to time. 
Interestingly, Ginsberg (1976, 41-44) provides some data supporting my 
contention that polarization has declined since the advent of polls. According 
to Ginsberg's content analysis of the Democratic and Republican platforms, 
there was a .017 average difference between the parties from 1940 to 1968 on 
their views on issues.'0 So, as suggested above, parties have differed on some 
issues since the introduction of polls. But between 1844 and 1936, which one 
could term the prepoll era, the average difference between the parties' plat- 
forms was .073, which is over four times greater than that between 1940 and 
1968. In addition, the frequency of "polarized" elections has dropped dra- 
matically since the advent of polling. Of the eight elections from 1940 to 
1968, the Goldwater-Johnson contest exhibited the greatest difference be- 
tween the parties' platforms: .041. No other election during this period ap- 
proached that difference. But from 1844 to 1936, more than 50% of the elec- 
tions showed a greater difference between the parties' platforms than that 
witnessed in the 1964 campaign. In fact for those "polarized" contests from 
1844 to 1936 the average difference was .175, which is more than a fourfold 
jump over the differences found in 1964. Thus, while the Johnson-Goldwater 
election is often seen as unusual in the "choice" it offered the electorate, 
Ginsberg's data suggest that such differences were common fare before the 
9Kelley's (1983) systematic analysis of the 1972 presidential election confirms the interpreta- 
tion that Caddell's polls suggested. 
1I chose 1940 as the cut point since Gallup began its polling of the national electorate in 1937 
and FDR started to use information from polls in 1939. Note that if one adopts later elections as 
starting points, it does not alter the basic finding. 
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introduction of polls. These data, therefore, provide support for the funda- 
mental conclusion of this paper: well-informed parties offer fewer differences 
on issues than poorly informed parties." 
Perhaps polarization need not come from the actions of parties, but in- 
stead from the electorate themselves."2 That is, one could argue that polar- 
ization might be inevitable regardless of how parties react, depending on the 
kind of change that occurs in the distribution of public opinion. If opinion is 
not normally distributed, but rather takes on a bipolar shape, the result 
might lead parties to adopt different positions on that issue (see diagram 4). 
Thus, the parties may be forced to take polarized positions, because of a 
sharp split in the electorate. Downs (1957, 118-19) reaches this conclusion. 
"It is unfortunate that Ginsberg's data do not include the last five presidential elections. It is 
unlikely, however, that these contests would change the basic finding. Even is one assumes that 
every election from 1972 to 1988 had differences between the parties similar to those Ginsberg 
reports in 1964, which is highly unlikely given the Ford-Carter and Dukakis-Bush races, parties 
still differed about three times more on issues before polls than after them. 
12If one moves beyond the traditional Downsian assumption that the party acts as a team, an 
additional source of polarization may arise. Specifically, polarization might come from the nomi- 
nating system. Polsby (1983), for instance, contends that the current arragnement encourages 
factionalism. With factionalism, one extreme group could capture the party and polarize the 
political debate. If one assumes, however, that factions still seek to win elections, as most 
Downsian models would, these groups should still adopt positions on highly salient issues that 
maximize their chance for victory in the general election. And these positions, given the avail- 
ability of polls, should not be polarizing. So regardless of the nominating system, polarization on 
highly salient issues can only emerge if one moves beyond the classic assumption that parties (or 
factions) seek to win elections. 
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Such a strategy is not, however, rational for parties. First, both parties would 
still be better off competing at the center, because that would maximize their 
support. Even though nearly all voters would be dissatisfied with those posi- 
tions, the rational voter would still choose between the lesser of two evils. 
More important, if one party (A) adopts a position in the center of one of the 
poles, a rational competitor (B) should move near that position and thus be- 
come the majority party (see diagram 5). 3 Thus, given the desire to win elec- 
tions, rational parties should try to take similar positons on highly salient 
issues-regardless of the shape of public opinion. 14 
Another criticism of this paper's thesis is that I have assumed that a re- 
alignment has not occurred since the development of polls. While there is 
disagreement on this point, a good deal of evidence indicates that the New 
Deal Party System is still intact (Sundquist 1983; Carmines and Stimson 
1989; Carmines, Renton, and Stimson 1984; Kelley 1988; Geer 1989). 
Clearly, there has been partisan change, as documented so well by Carmines 
and Stimson, but such change has not involved the emergence of a single 
issue that has forged a new party system. One might contend, for instance, 
that the erosion of the New Deal coalition signifies a realignment (Petrocik 
1981), but that change can take place without parties polarizing on new 
issues. As Sundquist (1983, 448) argues, "when the New Deal alignment is 
strengthened, the New Deal coalitions are weakened, and vice versa.'" In 
other words, the white South, for example, should develop stronger ties to 
the more conservative GOP since people in that region generally do not sup- 
port an activist federal government. Thus, changes in coalitions should be 
expected as demographic groups align themselves with the party that best 
represents their views. 
Even if one wants to quarrel with the claim that no realignment has oc- 
curred, it appears that recent partisan change has been different from the 
realignments in the 1850s, 1890s, and 1930s. In each of those cases one can 
point to an issue on which the parties took opposing stands that helped gen- 
erate change, such as slavery in the 1860s or free-silver in the 1890s. While 
the parties have not agreed on all issues that have surfaced over the last few 
decades, there has not been a major controversy that has led to a polarization 
"3Barry (1970, 114) make a similar point, arguing that a party which moves to the left to attract 
some extremist voters risks losing the election. If a party adopted that strategy, its opponent 
should match that position and thus secure a clear majority of the votes. 
14 One might argue that if parties take the center in a bipolar distribution, they could alienate 
enough voters to encourage the entrance of third parties into the fray. With competiton from 
the outside, the parties might be forced to take opposing positions in an effort to quell the at- 
tacks from insurgent groups. But in the United States, at least, third parties have a difficult time 
competing because of the election laws, which makes this possibility less likely (Rosenstone, 
Behr, and Lazarus 1984). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this argument, I shall assume a closed 
two-party system. 
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of the parties. Sundquist (1983), for instance, examines three divisive issues 
of the recent past (race relations, Vietnam, and the "social issue") and con- 
cludes that the parties "straddled" each of them-exactly what this theory 
would predict. In the case of Vietnam, Page and Brody (1972, 984) note that 
"there was . . . little difference between Nixon's and Humphrey's stated 
views on Vietnam policy." This war certainly could have brought about po- 
larization, especially if one party had paid attention to the many protests that 
dotted the landscape of the country. But boisterous crowds no longer de- 
ceive politicians about the opinions of the entire electorate, as they once de- 
ceived William Jennings Bryan. 15 
Now, of course, one might argue that even if the parties had polarized on 
an issue such as abortion or Vietnam, a realignment would not have oc- 
curred. These issues were simply not salient enough to the public to reshape 
the party system. Certainly these issues were not as momentous as those as- 
sociated with the Great Depression, but realigning issues need not possess 
such force. The issue of free-silver in the 1890s, for instance, was an impor- 
"5The issue of abortion may provide an interesting test for my argument. The GOP has clearly 
staked out an extreme position on abortion. And given that the Webster decision has increased 
the importance of this issue to the public, the GOP's nonmedian position on abortion may start 
costing them a large number of votes. The GOP is acutely aware of this problem, given public 
opinion polls. But the question is whether the GOP leadership will pay attention to the polls or 
will they remain committed to the position that many of the activists in the party hold so dear. 
The handful of elections in 1989 suggest that GOP candidates did try to scramble toward the 
"center." But the better test will be the upcoming 1992 elections, especially if the Supreme 
Court raises the stakes even more by overturning Roe v. Wade. 
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tant problem, but only part of the electorate appeared concerned about the 
matter-primarily the agrarian interests in the West and the financial inter- 
ests in the East (Glad 1960, chap. 3). Yet the issue of free-silver realigned the 
party system. While one cannot be sure, it seems reasonable to believe that 
the Vietnam War, race relations, and the so-called "social issue" were at least 
as important to the public as the concern over monetary policy in the 1890s. 
In 1968, for instance, about half of the electorate, according to a survey from 
the National Election Studies, said that Vietnam was the most important 
problem facing the nation. It is also worth recalling that realignments need 
not entail massive change in the partisanship of the electorate. Only a por- 
tion of the public needs to change, either through conversion or mobiliza- 
tion, for a new party system to emerge (Andersen 1979). In sum, there is 
reason to believe that some of the issues since the Great Depression could 
have led to a critical realignment of the party system. 
CONCLUSION 
The public opinion poll has had great impact on the study of political sci- 
ence. Much of what we know about political behavior can be attributed to 
survey research. While polls supply the evidence for some of our most im- 
portant theories about the behavior of the electorate, little effort has been 
made to consider how surveys might affect the behavior of politicians and the 
parties they represent.'6 This paper represents one such attempt. Building 
on the idea that polls provide reliable information, this paper provides a new 
perspective on partisan change. The basic conclusion is that the availability 
of quality survey research should make it unlikely that rational parties will 
disagree radically on highly salient issues, thereby thwarting most potential 
critical realignments. 
If so, political scientists should stop looking for critical realignments in the 
era of polls, since it is unlikely that any one election or even set of elections 
can be pointed to as realigning.'7 Instead, partisan change should be consid- 
ered a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. The discipline, there- 
fore, may want to focus much greater attention on the "gradual transforma- 
tions of the party system" rather than "abrupt" change normally associated 
with the critical realignments of the past (Carmines and Stimson 1984, 152). 
While critical realignments may be a thing of the past, partisan change still 
occurs. One mechanism for change arises from "low salience" issues. Parties, 
16 one exception, see Keech and Matthews (1976). They contend that the advent of polls 
has lessened the uncertainty of party leaders when choosing a presidential nominee, since "now 
. . .they had reliable and objective measures of individual popularity" (8). Their argument is of 
interest, since they too argue that polls have altered the behavior of politicians. 
"7See also Carmines and Stimson (1989), Sundquist (1983), Clubb et al. (1980) for additional 
discussions of the problems facing the concept of critical realignment. 
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depending on their preferences, can adopt different positions on issues like 
gun control or agricultural policy, since these concerns are only important to 
a small proportion of the electorate. Wittman (1983) makes this point, argu- 
ing that parties can pursue their preferred position on issues that are not 
central to winning elections. These differences, although minor, can chip 
away at the partisan loyalties of the electorate, generating slow piecemeal 
change that might look like Key's secular realignment or Carmines' and Stim- 
son's "issue evolution." 
Perhaps just as important as these conclusions is the model itself. That is, 
this paper provides an explicit explanation for why critical realignments oc- 
cur. It builds on the arguments of previous empirical and theoretical work 
that highly salient issues forge partisan change. Using a spatial model to rep- 
resent these realigning issues, this paper contends that the reactions of poli- 
ticians to these important issues are central to the process (see, also, Sund- 
quist 1983). Specifically, a realignment occurs when the leaderhip of the 
parties adopt polarized positions on a concern highly salient to the public, 
after which significant partisan change unfolds. And the party that correctly 
estimates public opinion becomes (or remains) the majority party. Certainly, 
if one believes that parties want to aviod becoming the minority party, it 
would be hard to explain why the leadership would stake out a losing posi- 
tion on a highly salient issue-unless they simply made a mistake. But, as 
noted so often above, such mistakes should be rare given the information 
available from public opinion polls, ushering in a new era of partisan change. 
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